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During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
Saudi Arabian government has paid 
more attention to the country's agri-
cultural sector than in the past, in-
creasing expenditure and loans to 
farmers. Spectacular increases in out-
put have resulted. This Viewpoint 
highlights some of the features which 
characterize Saudi agricultural de-
velopment, particularly in relation to 
private v public-sector expenditure. 
The author concludes that the rapid 
expansion cannot continue, and that 
the opportunity for the country to 
achieve a viable agricultural sector 
has passed. 
Robert E. Looney is Professor of National 
Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA 93943, USA. 
'Cecil Tunclap and Ugur Yavas, 'Agricultu-
ral development in Saudi Arabia: present 
status and prospects', Third World Plan-
ning Review, November 1983, p 333. 
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The geography, climate and topogra-
phy of Saudi Arabia have perhaps 
their greatest impact on the country's 
agriculture. It is in this sphere that 
such elements as frequent droughts, 
sudden changes in winter and summer 
temperatures, windstorms and water 
shortages are directly responsible for 
limiting both the maximum area under 
cultivation and the varieties of product 
produced in commercial quantities. In 
addition to these difficulties, the very 
poor and saline soil imposes con-
straints on agricultural development 
to a degree not encountered by other 
countries. 
This bleak picture is corroborated 
by the fact that, of the 220 million 
hectares of land in Saudi Arabia, only 
4.5 million hectares are arable. Furth-
ermore, only 525 000 hectares were 
under cultivation in 1981: little over 
one-tenth of the arable land. The 
major reison is the inadequacies in 
necessary agricultural infrastructure, 
including dams, irrigation and drain-
age networks, water wells and exten-
sive road systems linking agricultural 
areas with their markets. 1 
Historically, the sector has received 
scant attention from the authorities. 
In large part this stemmed from the 
belief that: 
e Saudi Arabia's national compara-
tive advantage was not in agricul-
ture, and 
e Relatively cheap food could al-
ways be bought from the world's 
surplus countries against exports 
of higher valued hydrocarbon 
products. 
Three events in the 1Q79s. however, 
made the planners pay more attention 
to the agricultural sector in the Second 
and especially Third Plan periods: 
e The emerging worldwide food 
shortage. 
e The emergence of veiled threats 
of food embargoes by the major 
supplying countries (presumably 
to counter oil price increases). 
e The more sobering realization 
that industralization in the king-
dom will not be adequate to 
provide sufficient jobs to employ 
a rapidly growing Saudi work-
force. 
Clearly the increase in oil revenue 
after 1973/74 facilitated increased 
allocations to the sector. During the 
Second Plan (1975-80). for example. 
the Saudi government budgeted and 
spent approximately $9.0 billion in 
current prices on agricultural and re-
lated water programmes. In addition. 
the Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank 
(SAAB), the government's main con-
duit to farmers for loans and subsidies. 
disbursed another $1.0 billion during 
this period. 
During the Second Plan, the real 
value of the agricultural sector in the 
kingdom's Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) increased at 5.4% per annum, 
surpassing the 4% per annum growth 
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2Data are from the Saudi Arabian Monet· 
ary Agency, Annual Report, various 
issues. 
3 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Re· 
port: Saudi Arabia, No 3, 1986, p 10. 
4There are no time series figures for 
subsidies paid to farmers. There is no 
evidence, however, that these have varied 
differently than credit has over time. The 
conclusions presented here, therefore, 
apply in principle to the government's 
subsidy programme. 
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rate targeted for the period. However, 
this growth rate was only one-third as 
rapid as the impressive growth rate 
recorded by the total non-oil sector 
during the same period. 
Agriculture performed even more 
strongly during the Third Plan (1980-
85), with a sizeable increase in private 
investment. growth in output of 8.7% 
per year, expansion of the workforce 
by 2.5% per year (despite a planned 
contraction at a similar rate), and the 
achievement of self-sufficiency in 
wheat. Much of this progress was 
achieved as a result of generous gov-
ernment loans and subsidies at both 
input and output levels. Loans granted 
by the Saudi Agricultural Bank in-
creased particularly rapidly2 after the 
oil price increases of 1973-74 and 
1979-80. In fact, subsidized loans 
from the Bank increased from 2.9% of 
the total value of agricultural output in 
1974 to nearly 50% in 1983. The ratio 
of subsidized loans to total commer-
cial bank private credit also increased 
from 0.8% to 7.3% during this period. 
However, beginning in 1984 there 
has been a dramatic fall in the volume 
of loans and subsidies allocated to 
agriculture. In fact, it is now accepted 
that with the post-1982 decline in 
government oil revenues, the experi-
ment in massive government support 
for agriculture will be significantly 
reduced. In essence the government is 
shifting much of the burden of future 
investment to the private sector. 
There is considerable opposition to 
any reduction in farm support or other 
government subsidies to the sector. In 
fact, a very influential 'farm lobby', in 
part financed by the huge profits made 
possible by government programmes, 
has develoP'!d in Saudi Arabia. 3 The 
reason is fairly simple: the subsidized 
price of wheat is determined not by 
the fact that it currently stands at 
around five times world prices, but 
that, at SR2000/ton, it offers a fair 
profit margin over production costs. 
These are estimated at about SR 1250/ 
ton on the efficient farms. The farm 
lobby consists not only of large private 
wheat farmers, but also of large pro-
vincial joint stock companies handled 
by royal governors. 
There is no question that most of 
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the accelerated growth in agricultural 
output over the past decade can be 
attributed to various government 
programmes and support. These in-
clude, in addition to interest-free loans 
and subsidized prices noted above, the 
free distribution of land and outright 
subsidies for buying machinery, ferti-
lizers and other materials. 
With the decline in oil revenues 
beginning in 1982, a cutback in some 
of these programmes was only a mat-
ter of time. This, together with the 
introduction of water tariffs for heavy 
users, has produced widespread con-
cern in official circles that the attrac-
tiveness to local businessmen of furth-
er investment in this sector may be 
rapidly declining. 
In this context, it is of interest to 
assess the future viability of the sector. 
Government programmes 
Clearly, any assessment of the sus-
tainability of growth in the agricultural 
sector involves identifying the relative 
importance of factors that hllve contri-
buted to the sector's output in recent 
years. As noted above, credit to the 
agricultural sector increased dramati-
cally during the post 1973-74 oil 
boom, with most of the funds pro-
vided by the Agricultural Develop-
ment Bank. In terms of future policy, 
it is important to determine: 
e Have these funds4 been effective 
in increasing the sector's output? 
e Could other measures such as the 
overall growth of government de-
mand and/or expansion of 
private-sector expenditures be as 
effective in the future in stimulat-
ing increased agricultural output? 
e How important have oil revenues 
per se been in stimulating agri-
cultural production (compared 
with other sectors)? 
e How important has commercial 
credit i·n general been to the 
sector's expansion (again, com-
pared to that of other sectors)? In 
other words, given required cut-
backs in government program-
mes, could the commercial bank-
ing system be expected to fill the 
financial vacuum for the agri-
cultural sector? 
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5The full model and detailed statistical 
analysis are presented in Robert E. 
Looney, Response of the Saudi Arabian 
Private Sector to Government Initiatives in 
Agriculture, Working Paper, Department of 
National Security Affairs, Naval Postgradu-
ate School, Monterey, CA, 1987. It is 
available from the author upon request. 
6See, for example, the framework de-
veloped in Robert E. Looney, 'The impact 
of petroleum exports on the Saudi Arabian 
economy'. in Robert Stookey, ed, The 
Arabian Peninsula, Hoover Institution 
Press, Stanford, CA, 1984, pp 37-64. 
7Bruce Johnston and John Mellor, 'The 
role of agriculture in economic develop-
ment'. American Economic Review, 
September 1961, pp 571-581. 
8For a precise definition of these concepts 
see M.M. Metwally and H.U. Tamaschke, 
'Oil exports and growth in the Middle East'. 
Kyklos, 1980, p 500. 
9A.O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Econo-
mic Development, Yale University Press, 
New Haven, CT, 1958. 
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In order to gain some insight into 
the impact of government subsidized 
loan programmes. a model5 was con-
structed whereby it was assumed that 
output in the agricultural sector ex-
panded over time as a result of various 
impacts - either through increasing 
the overall demand for agricultural 
output or through lowering the costs 
of production in the sector. h 
In terms of the first two questions 
posed above, several clear patterns 
characterize the role of agricultural 
credit and overall demand effects on 
Saudi Arabian agriculture: 
e In general, agricultural credit is 
significant and very strong in its 
impact on agricultural output. 
e Agricultural output follows a dis-
tributed lag pattern, whereby in-
creases in overall expenditures or 
agricultural credit not only affect 
production in the current year, 
but also are significant over time 
in contributing to increased pro-
duction. 
e i'nterestingly enough, after 
accounting for overall demand 
and supply effects produced by 
(a) money supply and (b) agri-
cultural credit, government ex-
penditures and private-sector ex-
penditures do not induce further 
expansion in the agricultural sec-
tor. 
e Agricultural credit experienced a 
great increase in volume after the 
oil price increases in 1973-74, but 
apparently this credit has under-
gone a significant structural 
change in that its productivity or 
effecti~eness - while still positive 
and strong in expanding the sec-
tor's output - experienced dimi-
nishing returns after 1973. 
Clearly, agricultural credit has been a 
major factor accounting for Saudi 
Arabia's agricultural boom. It is im-
portant to note that it has been much 
more significant than the expansion of 
either private or government demand. 
In other words, Saudi agriculture 
appears largely supply driven, and 
based on (artificial, ie subsidized) 
cost-reducing government program-
mes rather than the more common 
situation in successful developing 
countries whereby the sector gradually 
expands to satisfy an overall expan-
sion in the demand for food. 7 This fact 
calls into some question the viability 
of the agricultural sector. More pr~­
cisely, given the fact that the country 
has been rapidly expanding its agri-
cultural base through fairly high levels 
of subsidies that cannot be sustained 
indefinitely (given anticipated oil re-
venues over the next few years), the 
future of the sector is uncertain at 
best. 
· Since these results were somewhat 
surprising, it was of some interest to 
see if they were co11firmed by alterna-
tive tests. Comparisons with the im-
pacts on other sectors produced by 
credit and the expansion of private-
and public-sector demand should also 
provide additional insights to the 
mechanisms at work in inducing ex-
pansion in private-sector output. 
The first test examined the impact 
of commercial bank credit on the 
sector's output, and found that: 
e The agricultural sector has not 
been responsive to the general 
expansion in commercial bank 
credit. Output in the sector 
appears, therefore, only respon-
sive to the specialized credit and 
subsidies from the Agricultural 
Development Bank and not to 
the overall credit expansion (in-
cluding some specific loans to the 
agricultural sector). 
e Manufacturing, wholesale and re-
tail trade, and non-oil income 
were all strongly stimulated by 
commercial bank credit. 
e Of these sectors, however, manu-
facturing suffered a proportionate 
reduction in credit, with whole-
sale and retail trade perhaps ex-
periencing an increased propor-
tion of credit after 1973. 
The next factor examined is the 
mechanism by which oil revenues have 
had an impact on agriculture. and 
non-agricultural sectors. In addition to 
their direct demand linkages, oil re-
venues have the potential to contri-
bute to sectoral growth indirectly 
through spread or carryover effects. 8 
This indirect contribution to growth 
embraces Hirschman-type linkages9 
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and can broadly be considered as a 
sequence of multiplier-accelerator 
mechanisms. 
In Saudi Arabia's case the relative 
degree of direct impact and sectoral 
spread effects emanating from the oil 
sector: 
e Do not appear to have had a very 
significant impact on the agri-
cultural sector through their in-
direct linkage or spread effects. 
e Do have a significant impact on 
other sectors, with several sectors 
receiving a strong stimulus from 
expanded oil exports. These in-
clude: mining, manufacturing, 
construction, wholesale and retail 
trade, and transportation and 
communications. 
e Have created some absorptive 
capacity problems in the post-
1973-74 period, notably in 
wholesale and retail trade and in 
transportation and communica-
tions. 
In general, therefore, the agricultural 
sector was somewhat unique in not 
receiving benefits from the spread 
effects associated with the develop-
ment of the oil sector. 
Similar tests were performed to 
determine the differential impact on 
sector output of increases in private-
sector demand, and increases in 
public-sector expenditures. 
e As in the results discussed above, 
agricultural output is apparently 
unresponsive to increases in pri-
vate demand (which includes 
private-sector consumption); 
e On the other hand, manufactur-
ing, wholesale and retail trade, 
transportation and communica-
tioll, and overall non-oil income 
have been stimulated over time 
by increased private-sector ex-
penditures. 
In general, therefore, a number of 
private-sector activities have ex-
panded to satisfy a growing demand 
for goods and services generated by 
increased levels of private-sector con-
sumption and investment. However, 
the agricultural sector does not appear 
to be one of these activities. In fact, 
the picture that emerges is one of 
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agriculture being something of a spe-
cial case in that, in contrast to a 
number of other private-sector activi-
ties, the sector is not particularly 
responsive to increased levels of de-
mand generated directly by either th'e 
private or public sector. 
If not directly, government expendi-
ture must impact indirectly on the 
agricultural sector by expanding the 
overal volume of credit provided by 
the Agricultural Development Bank. 
Here several interesting patterns have 
developed over a period of time: 
e Oil revenues have been more 
instrumental in increasing agri-
cultural credit than government 
expenditures; that is, agricultural 
credit is much more closely linked 
with the receipt of oil revenue 
than with the general disburse-
ment of these revenues in the 
form of government allocations. 
Agricultural credit, therefore, 
follows a pattern somewhat diffe-
rent from the normal expansion 
or contraction in ·public-sec.tor 
allocations. 
e The proportion of oil revenue 
allocated to agricultural credit fell 
dramatically during the high and 
expanding oil revenue years -
1974-82. 
There are only weak distributed lag 
relationships between oil revenue and 
government expenditures, indicating 
that credit programmes to this sector 
are not as continuous as in the case of 
other programmes, and that credit 
allocations are susceptible to erratic 
ups and downs depending on the 
movement in oil revenues. 
Summary and conclusions 
To respond to a number of concerns. 
the Saudi government has in the past 
decade provided a massive volume of 
funds for the development of the 
agricultural sector. The results have 
been spectacular in terms of overall 
increases in output. Oil revenues can 
and will continue to provide the means 
to overcome directly or indirectly 
some of the major constraints. 
However, the analysis above identifies 
some major concerns facing Saudi 
agriculture: 
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10see Tunclap and Yavas, op cit, Ref 1, p 
346. 
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e The sector has been almost en-
tirely dependent on government 
loans and subsidies for its expan-
sion. 
e In contrast to many other private 
sectors in the kingdom, the sector 
has not been responsive to in-
creased demand in the form of 




power or expenditures. 
Also in contrast to several other 
private sectors, agriculture does 
not appear to be responsive to 
non-subsidized credit from the 
commercial banking system. 
Because agricultural credit 
appears to be more closely re-
lated to increases in oil revenues 
than government expenditures, it 
appears that this sector will not be 
supported to the extent that other 
programmes will be through 
spending out of the public sector's 
foreign portfolio. 
On the other hand, reduced 
<1llocations to the sector should, 
because of their low productivity 
during periods of high oil re-
venues, increase the marginal 
productivity of future, albeit low-
er, levels of expenditure. The net 
result of this effect should be to 
• 
lessen somewhat the effect lower 
government expenditures would 
normally be expected to have on 
output. 
In short, one cannot be as optimistic 
as C. Tunclap and U. Yavas were only 
several years ago: 
At the present and for the foreseeahk 
future, Saudi Arabia's oil-wealth will pro-
vide the necessary hard currency to finance 
imports of food. However, it should not he 
forgotten that there is a ·window of time· 
for Saudi Arabia for diversifying its re-
venue base which at the present time 
comes from the export of one depleting 
source, crude oil. Developing a modern 
and effective agricultural sector to usher 
Saudi Arabia towards self-sufficiency in 
food is one avenue open to the Govo:rn-
ment planners. However, the real ch<1l-
lenge facing Saudi Arabia is to arrive at this 
development objective long before the 
'window in time' closes. 1" 
The analysis above. however. leads to 
the unmistakable conclµsion that 
rapid expansion of the agricultural 
sector along the lines achieved in the 
Third Plan period is a luxury that even 
the Saudis will be unlikely to be abk 
to continue to afford. Unfortunately 
for the kingdom, the 'window in time· 
for achieving a viable agricultural sec-
tor appears to have closed. 
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